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Since January 1994, many banks in the United States have initiated retail-deposit sweep 
programs which reduce statutory reserve requirements by re-labeling transaction deposits  
as money market deposit accounts. As a result, approximately half of aggregate 
transaction deposits are now excluded from M1. This re-labeling is invisible to customers 
and, hence, cannot affect their demand for transaction balances.  Nevertheless, a recent 
article in this Journal explored the effect of this invisible re-labling on M1 demand. This 
note emphasizes that those results are spurious, and offers additional examples of 
measurement distortions due to retail deposit sweep activity. 
   3
In a recent issue of this Journal, Dutkowsky and Cynamon (2003) analyze the 
effect of retail-deposit sweep programs on demand for the Federal Reserve’s M1 
monetary aggregate.  The authors conclude that a new monetary aggregate—M1S, equal 
to the sum of published M1 plus Federal Reserve estimates of the amounts of transaction 
deposits involved in retail-deposit sweep programs—displays better time-series behavior 
than published M1 alone. 
It is my purpose in this note to emphasize that this conclusion is the only sensible 
one.  Retail-deposit sweep programs are only accounting changes:  they do not affect the 
amounts of transaction deposits that banks’ customers perceive themselves to own.   
Since January 1994, banks in the United States have widely adopted retail-deposit 
sweep programs to reduce their required reserves.  In such programs, transaction deposits 
are re-labeled as money market deposit accounts. At larger banks, transaction deposits are 
subject to statutory reserves requirements as high as 10 percent, while MMDA deposits, 
under terms of the 1982 Garn-St. Germain Act, are subject to the zero-percent reserve 
requirement ratio applicable to savings deposits.
1  This account re-labeling is invisible to 
bank customers, as discussed by Anderson (1995, 2002) and Anderson and Rasche 
(2001).  Behind the scenes, funds are “transferred” from the MMDA to the transaction 
account as necessary, subject to legal restrictions on the number of transfers that may be 
made each month.
2 The amount of swept deposits is not reported separately to the Federal 
Reserve but is included in the aggregate amounts of savings deposits reported to the 
                                                 
1 The Garn-St.Germain Act created the money market deposit account and prohibits the Federal Reserve 
Board from classifying the account as a transaction account for reserve-requirement purposes. 
2 As of this writing, there are no restrictions on the number of transfers from the transaction deposit to the 
MMDA and a limit of six transfers per month from the MMDA to the transaction account (more than six 
transfers causes the MMDA to be subject to the same statutory reserve requirements as transaction 
deposits).   4
Federal Reserve.  The amounts of retail-sweep program deposits are not included in the 
M1 monetary aggregate.  
Except perhaps for an insert delivered with a monthly account statement or the 
fine-print in a deposit contract, retail-deposit sweep activity is invisible to bank 
customers.  Since the customer perceives no change in the amount of transaction deposits 
that she owns, her behavior cannot be affected by operation of the retail-deposit sweep.  
   Dutkowsky and Cynamon’s analysis concludes that the introduction of retail-
deposit sweeps has not shifted the demand for M1S, that is, the sum of the Federal 
Reserve’s published M1 aggregate plus the estimated amounts of transaction deposits 
relabeled by banks as MMDA for the calculation of statutory reserve requirements.  An 
equivalent conclusion is that households and firms did not change their behavior in 
response to an event that they did not observe, an event that was invisible to them.  The 
authors’ rejection of their weak null hypothesis—that the demand for published M1, 
excluding retail-sweep deposits, is the same as the demand for an M1 aggregate [M1S] 
that includes all the transaction deposits perceived by households and firms—is the only 
sensible conclusion.  Any other conclusion would be suspect. 
It is important to understand that retail-deposit sweep activity has placed a wedge 
in published data between the balance sheets of households and firms, as seen by the 
households and firms, and the balance sheets of banks.  Today, households (and firms) 
perceive themselves to own approximately twice as many transaction deposits in 
depository institutions as those same depository institutions report to the Federal Reserve 
(and the Federal Reserve includes in M1):  During 2002, the amount of transaction   5
deposits included in M1 was approximately equal to the amount of transaction deposits 
estimated to be involved in retail-deposit sweep programs (see Figure 1). 
   Retail-deposit sweep programs—and the related distortions to published banking 
data—are the economic equivalent of households and banks maintaining “two sets of 
books” to foil the [reserve requirement] tax collector.  The existence of multiple books, 
that is, of multiple financial balance sheets, causes difficulties for other analyses as well.  
Figure 2 shows the ratio of total bank vault cash (as published on the Board of Governors 
H.3 release) to two measures of transaction deposits.  The first measure equals the 
amounts of transaction deposits included in M1, and the second is that amount plus the 
estimated amount of deposits involved in retail-deposit sweep programs.  Excluding 
sweep programs, there is a mysterious 60 percent increase in the ratio of vault cash to 
transaction deposits between 1995 and 2002; including sweep programs, the ratio drifts 
downward slowly, likely due to innovations in cash management.  Bankers, being neither 
naïve nor foolish,  understand that the amounts of transactions deposits that households 
and firms perceive themselves to own at banks is approximately twice what the banks 
report to the Federal Reserve; prudently, the bankers maintain sufficient vault cash to 
service those customer balances.  
The existence of two sets of books also affects the Federal Reserve’s Flow of 
Funds accounts.  These accounts show a precipitous drop in households’ holdings of 
checkable deposits and currency, from $615 billion at the beginning of 1994 to $322 
billion at the beginning of 2003.
3  The reason for the drop is clear from the discussion in 
                                                 
3 Note that, in the Flow of Funds accounts, currency held by the household sector excludes U.S. currency 
held abroad (estimated foreign-held U.S. currency is shown separately as an asset of the rest-of-the-world 
sector).  At the end of 2002, the Flow of Funds accounts showed an estimated $301 billion in currency held   6
the Board staff’s Flow of Funds guidebook: the household sector is calculated as a 
residual from the deposit figures reported by depository institutions to the Board for 
reserve-requirement purposes.
4  If all households could be surveyed directly, they would 
reply that they hold approximately twice as many transaction deposits as shown in the 
Flow of Funds accounts.  The effects in the Flow of Funds accounts are summarized in 
Figure 3, which shows the sum of currency and checkable deposits held by households 
and nonprofit organizations as shares of their total financial assets.
5  Including estimates 
of the amount of deposits involved in retail-deposit sweeps, the share (upper panel) is 
approximately 2 percent; excluding the amounts in retail sweeps results in mis-measuring 
(understating) the share by two-thirds.  In the lower panel, including the amount of 
deposits in retail sweeps extends the 1952–1995 downward trend forward to later years; 
excluding amounts in retail-deposit sweeps causes a mysterious acceleration in the rate of 
decrease of the share.  A similar measurement distortion is apparent in Figure 4, which 
shows the ratio of personal consumption expenditures to the household sector’s holdings 
of currency plus checkable deposits.  Excluding retail deposit sweeps, velocity displays 
an untenable increase after 1994, while including sweeps leaves velocity at 
approximately its previous value.  This velocity pattern likely was an important factor in 
Dutkowsky and Cynamon’s empirical tests rejecting published M1 in favor of M1S as a 
measure of a transaction monetary aggregate for the United States. 
                                                                                                                                                 
abroad and $309.6 billion held outside banks by the private sector (including state and local government) in 
the United States.  
4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2000), vol. 1, p. 183, and vol. 2, p. 725. 
5 In Figures 3 and 4, end-of-quarter figures have been averaged to approximate the period-average figures 
used in the Federal Reserve’s monetary aggregates, and to correspond with quarterly personal consumption 
expenditures.   7
There are additional, alternative channels through which retail-deposit sweeps 
might affect money demand.  It is possible that the expansion of retail-deposit sweep 
programs since 1995 has changed the demand for M1 by changing the opportunity cost of 
transaction deposits.  Empirical studies suggest that the quantity of transaction deposits 
held by households and firms is sensitive to the deposits’ opportunity cost, and market 
competition might have caused banks to use the marginal earnings from sweeps to temper 
charges for transaction deposits.  Although this is a movement along rather than a shift in 
the demand curve, measurement errors in the opportunity cost might make it difficult for 
the econometrician to disentangle the two.  Some support for this view was presented by 
Anderson (2002) who concludes, based on data from the Federal Reserve’s annual survey 
of retail fees charged by depository institutions (see Hannon, 2002), that fees on retail 
accounts since 1995 have increased somewhat less than other prices as measured by the 
chain-price index for personal consumption expenditures. 
Finally, it is important for researchers to understand the limitations of available 
retail-deposit sweep data.  Depository institutions are not required to report to the Federal 
Reserve the amounts of deposits in retail-deposit sweep programs.  Some depositories 
have voluntarily informed the Federal Reserve when they began retail sweep programs, 
while others have not. In other cases, Federal Reserve staff and computer software have 
detected large simultaneous changes in transaction and savings deposits, the signature of 
the beginning of a retail deposit sweep program.  But, there is no continuing reporting 
requirement for the amount of deposits involved in retail sweep programs.  Although 
many depository institutions are required to report their end-of-day deposit balances by 
type of account, they are not required to identify those saving deposits that have been   8
swept from retail transaction accounts.  Absent such reporting, the extent of measurement 
error in available retail-deposit sweep program figures is unknown.  Anderson and 
Rasche (2001) conclude, for data through the end of 1999, that their individual-bank 
estimates of amounts swept likely are quite accurate because individual-bank ratios of 
vault cash to total transaction deposits (including sweeps) differ little during the period 
after sweeping begins from values prior to sweeping.  But their analysis considers only a 
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